OT - For history bufffs - books on Gettysburg

[VaNtyLion]

Just got done with about my 10th book on Gettysburg - Tom Carhart's Lost Triumph.

Curious if anyone else has read this and what their thoughts are on Carhart's conclusions regarding Lee's real plan for July 3. I've been to the battlefield many times but have only made it out to the East Cavalry Field once, so I thought the book was a new slant on some mostly existing material. I enjoyed it and think much of what he says is easily plausible, and actually makes more sense than what is commonly held.

His historical references to Napoleon, Frederick the Great and Hannibal fit well. My dad is a West Pointer and I have some of his old text books with hundreds of pages of maps on the Napoleonic Wars and American History from 1776-1865. It still blows the mind how these guys fought battles.

 

[fairgambit]

I read the book about a year ago and found it compelling. I've always had difficulty understanding how a commander as brilliant as Lee could have blundered so badly with Pickett's charge. The charge makes sense if Lee intended to use Stuart's cavalry as part of a coordinated attack. It was risky, as the results have shown, but Lee had supreme confidence in his army and felt it was worth the gamble. As I said, it's been a year since I finished it and have been meaning to give it another read to further enhance my understanding of Carhart's theory. I think now is the time.

 

[dawgduice]

Actually, I think Lee knew exactly what he was doing. It was, as he knew, the ONLY chance the South had to end the war. Not win it, but maybe get the North to think fighting was not worth it. Shelby Foote said it best " the North fought the war with one arm tied behind it's back". Lee knew what was coming, so he rolled the dice. When he failed he knew it was just a matter of time. That battle angered and encouraged the North to "declare total war". And we saw that in short order with Sherman. Before that battle the North was basically content to win the war by attrition, which was inevitable. I do not think Northern Business men nor politicians wanted to launch such destruction.

The best Historical book I've read on the Civil War was McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom. Foote's series would be second. As far as enjoyable reading it would be "A Stillness at Appomattox".

I have not read "Lost Triumph", I'll give it a try

 

[We Are . . .]

I read Carhart's book a few years ago. It's an interesting hypothesis but has stirred up a lot of criticism, much of it by historian Eric Wittenberg. Here are 3 links for you:
http://www.civilwarinteractive.com/forums/forum5/42.html
http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=5
http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3045

You might enjoy Troy Harman's "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" which offers another explanation of Lee's actions. Allen C. Guelzo's "Gettysburg: The Last Invasion" is another book I read recently and enjoyed.

I haven't read Eric Wittenberg's "Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg" which is at odds with Carhart but it's on my wish list.

 

[Beech Cricker]

I read the book about a year ago and found it compelling. I've always had difficulty understanding how a commander as brilliant as Lee could have blundered so badly with Pickett's charge.

Lee apparently did not learn from his past mistake--Malvern Hill--in terms of a frontal assault against a well-defended position.

 

[Obliviax]

Actually, I think Lee knew exactly what he was doing. It was, as he knew, the ONLY chance the South had to end the war. Not win it, but maybe get the North to think fighting was not worth it. Shelby Foote said it best " the North fought the war with one arm tied behind it's back". Lee knew what was coming, so he rolled the dice. When he failed he knew it was just a matter of time. That battle angered and encouraged the North to "declare total war". And we saw that in short order with Sherman. Before that battle the North was basically content to win the war by attrition, which was inevitable. I do not think Northern Business men nor politicians wanted to launch such destruction.

The best Historical book I've read on the Civil War was McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom. Foote's series would be second. As far as enjoyable reading it would be "A Stillness at Appomattox".

I have not read "Lost Triumph", I'll give it a try

I totally agree. Lee was a master at flanking maneuvers. If you study his battles, he used calvary to coordinate incredible flanking moves, especially when soldiers were on foot with some awful equipment to wear and carry. He almost won Gettysburg, by flanking little round top but a corporal realized, at the last second, how thin they were, got reinforcements and heroically stopped the flank. The topography of the area makes it next to impossible to flank any further.

While the north was well entrenched and protected, they had no place to go in a route. Lee, I believe, recognized this. He also recognized that the South had to have decisive victories to drive the north into some kind of negotiated settlement. An assault on Philly, splitting PA, was just the ticket. And, it was July. Lee had two more months before the rainy season with tens of thousands of soldiers traveling by foot. It was, for all intents and purposes, the time.

After two days, flanking cut off, and out of touch with the calvary, he settled on Picket's charge. Yeah, it failed but not by much. Had he broken through the line, the North's army would have been routed and crumbled. It wasn't such a dumb move as one born of desperation and logic....but one that failed just the same.

Lee's retreat is also evidence of this, IMHO. He could have sacrificed his losses and gone deeper into the North. But I think he knew it was over. They just didn't have the time and resources.

 

[PSU87]

I read Carhart's book a few years ago. It's an interesting hypothesis but has stirred up a lot of criticism, much of it by historian Eric Wittenberg. Here are 3 links for you:
http://www.civilwarinteractive.com/forums/forum5/42.html
http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=5
http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=3045

You might enjoy Troy Harman's "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" which offers another explanation of Lee's actions. Allen C. Guelzo's "Gettysburg: The Last Invasion" is another book I read recently and enjoyed.

I haven't read Eric Wittenberg's "Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg" which is at odds with Carhart but it's on my wish list.

+1 on The Last Invasion, really enjoyed it. Talk about interesting theories, Guelzo pretty much states that the Confederate fixation on Little Round Top was a waste of time. If they had wheeled left they could have rolled right along Cemetery Ridge right up the Union line and probably end the battle on the 2nd day. The Union didn't have enough troops or guns on the hill to matter. Only the continued Confederate attacks on it brought the additional Union attention to it and made it a focal point.

 

[Beech Cricker]

He also recognized that the South had to have decisive victories to drive the north into some kind of negotiated settlement. An assault on Philly, splitting PA, was just the ticket.

Lee's retreat is also evidence of this, IMHO. He could have sacrificed his losses and gone deeper into the North. But I think he knew it was over. They just didn't have the time and resources.

I think just the opposite--Lee already had decisive victories--in Virginia. The South had a better chance of winning the war by dragging it out and letting war weariness in the North really take hold. Perhaps a defensive strategy would have been better. I believe Longstreet promoted this.

Interesting thought about Lee possibly heading further north after Gettysburg. But he seemed very, very concerned about his supply line. Such was the case with Antietam, too.

 

[Obliviax]

I think just the opposite--Lee already had decisive victories--in Virginia. The South had a better chance of winning the war by dragging it out and letting war weariness in the North really take hold. Perhaps a defensive strategy would have been better. I believe Longstreet promoted this.

Interesting thought about Lee possibly heading further north after Gettysburg. But he seemed very, very concerned about his supply line. Such was the case with Antietam, too.

its an interesting point but why would Lee have invaded PA then? That wouldn't comport with a "defensive" strategy. Secondly, the "supply line" issue, in my mind, is also evidence of Lee's intent. Not to mention the whole battle started with Lee looking for shoes and other supplies in the Gettysburg area when stumbling upon the army of the North. Something made Lee stretch his supply lines. Again, i think it was because he realized that summer was the summer he needed to win the war. Attrition was on the side of the North from a logistics standpoint. Also, at that time, peace loving "moderates" were gaining momentum and congress was beginning to push for a negotiated settlement. Lee's notion was to cause some damage, bring the war into the peaceniks front yard, and stir the pot for a negotiated settlement.

I have far too great of opinion of Lee's war tactics to allow for a "gross misjudgment" regarding Picket's charge. it simply is out of step with Lee's book of business. There had to be a reason why he took that risk (opposing general was not proven and previous generals were incompetent so there's that too).

 

[manatree]

its an interesting point but why would Lee have invaded PA then? That wouldn't comport with a "defensive" strategy. Secondly, the "supply line" issue, in my mind, is also evidence of Lee's intent. Not to mention the whole battle started with Lee looking for shoes and other supplies in the Gettysburg area when stumbling upon the army of the North. Something made Lee stretch his supply lines. .

The whole "Shoes & Supplies at Gettysburg" has been a continuing myth (Shoes at Gettysburg).
A bunch of confederates had been through Gettysburg a few days earlier looking for supplies and pretty much already stole what was to be stolen. There was no shoe factory or warehouse.

The reason the battle took place at Gettysburg is because at that time, pretty much all roads led to Gettysburg and the Confederate infantry had no idea where the Union army was because they lost contact with the bulk of their cavalry.

I think there were a few reasons that Lee crossed the Potomac.

1) He was hoping that taking the battle to the North would help pressure a settlement. Maryland had heavy southern sympathies and there was a very strong Copperhead movement in Pennsylvania.

2) If he could keep his army far enough north through the summer & fall, it would keep both armies out of Virginia, allowing Virginia and their farmers to catch a bit of a break. Allow Virginia some time to harvest and stockpile, while both armies are feeding on Maryland & Pennsylvania instead of the south.

 

[Beech Cricker]

2) If he could keep his army far enough north through the summer & fall, it would keep both armies out of Virginia, allowing Virginia and their farmers to catch a bit of a break. Allow Virginia some time to harvest and stockpile, while both armies are feeding on Maryland & Pennsylvania instead of the south.

I think this is a HUGE factor. The farms in Virginia were simply worn out from hostilities being so close at hand. Surely this was already having a significant impact on Lee's army. Why not move north into "fresh" territory?

 

[rotzc]

I watched an interesting hypothesis on the history channel about why Picketts Charge failed. It stated that there was a split rail fence on both sides of what, I believe was the Baltimore Pike, within 100 yards of the Union cannons. It caused the confederate troops to basically double stack vertically while climbing the fences and the union canister shot was devastating. Plus allowed extra volleys of rifle fire during the climb.

In retrospect, they said that if the fence would have been removed the night before that there was a better than average chance they would have split the union line possibly changed the outcome of the charge.

 

[dawgduice]

its an interesting point but why would Lee have invaded PA then? That wouldn't comport with a "defensive" strategy. Secondly, the "supply line" issue, in my mind, is also evidence of Lee's intent. Not to mention the whole battle started with Lee looking for shoes and other supplies in the Gettysburg area when stumbling upon the army of the North. Something made Lee stretch his supply lines. Again, i think it was because he realized that summer was the summer he needed to win the war. Attrition was on the side of the North from a logistics standpoint. Also, at that time, peace loving "moderates" were gaining momentum and congress was beginning to push for a negotiated settlement. Lee's notion was to cause some damage, bring the war into the peaceniks front yard, and stir the pot for a negotiated settlement.

I have far too great of opinion of Lee's war tactics to allow for a "gross misjudgment" regarding Picket's charge. it simply is out of step with Lee's book of business. There had to be a reason why he took that risk (opposing general was not proven and previous generals were incompetent so there's that too).

Many of Lee's victories were really ties. They were mostly like a boxing match, winning rounds but no knockout. He never won a decisive battle. He took their "knockout" shot at Gettysburg. That being said, the South could not win nor reach a peace agreement without a TRUE victory. Look, he was a terrific general, but the odds were stacked against him. It happened to Napoleon, Rommel and others when men and resources were low.

 

[fairgambit]

Many of Lee's victories were really ties. They were mostly like a boxing match, winning rounds but no knockout. He never won a decisive battle. He took their "knockout" shot at Gettysburg. That being said, the South could not win nor reach a peace agreement without a TRUE victory. Look, he was a terrific general, but the odds were stacked against him. It happened to Napoleon, Rommel and others when men and resources were low.

I would consider Chancellorsville a decisive victory for Lee. It was his masterpiece.

 

[Beech Cricker]

I would consider Chancellorsville a decisive victory for Lee. It was his masterpiece.

Even more decisive: Second Bull Run.

I've long felt Lee lucked out at Chancellorsville. He split his army almost directly in the enemy's front--a big no-no. Fortunately for Lee, his opposition did not read the signs very well, so to speak.

 

[fairgambit]

Even more decisive: Second Bull Run.

I've long felt Lee lucked out at Chancellorsville. He split his army almost directly in the enemy's front--a big no-no. Fortunately for Lee, his opposition did not read the signs very well, so to speak.

You can call it luck. I would call it Jackson.

 

[Cletus11]

I think why Gettysburg is pretty much a given in that Lee knew that the North would eventually win through sheer attrition as his troops were getting tired and could not be replenished and there was not much time left before he did not have enough army to fight with. So he had to go North, win a few battles, and try to break the will of the North to come to a settlement.

Why Pickett's charge is the real question as to date Lee had been masterful and that appeared to be a major blunder. Cavalry gone missing is one reason. No Stonewall Jackson to rely on was another reason. Plain bad luck a third reason. Why he did it was I think it just got to the point where he decided to go all in Texas Hold-em style with a low pair and hope he won. He had gotten so far and turning back was not an option. Things were not going exactly according to plan and his generals were getting restless and starting to fight each other on what to do. So Lee had to make a decisive move as he knew the North was only continuing to re-inforce on a daily basis and that within a couple of days the North would have just outnumbered him so much that it would be impossible. So he came up with the 'best' plan he could come up with recognizing that plan was not that good but had to be done. I think he was hoping for a little luck his way, that his Southern boys would win the day with superior willpower, that the Northern generals would make another stupid maneuver to lose the battle (something that most Northern generals had done to date on most of the larger battles). Unfortunately for him, he didn't get lucky as the cavalry really never showed up and the Northern leadership didn't blunder, and the Northern troops fought a little harder than they had in the past and his Southern troops were more beaten down then he had thought due to lack of nutrition and sheer exhaustion due to the weather.

 

[Beech Cricker]

You can call it luck. I would call it Jackson.

Yet Union officers reported Jackson's movements before the grand flank attack yet the higher ups did nothing about it.

 

[PSU87]

Civil War battles seldom ended up being "decisive" because of the tactics used. Casualties were high on both sides, so the "winner" was usually just as spent as the loser. For how much Gettysburg is hailed as a decisive Union victory, Union casualties were HIGHER than Confederate, and the AOP was in no shape whatsoever to pursue and destroy a beaten Army of N. Virginia. If the victory were "decisive" it wouldn't have taken another year and a half to finish the war.

On the Confederate side, Chancellorsville is probably their best example of a "decisive" victory, but again, sending the AOP limping back across the Rapahannock could hardly be considered decisive. Casualties were about 18000 Union, 13000 Confederate. A fair difference to be sure, but still not decisive.

One good reason I've read about Civil War battles not being decisive was both sides lack of true Cavalry. Both sides used it primarily as a recon, skirmishing and scouting arm. Compare that to Cavalry in the Napoleonic Wars where it was used as a striking arm that would ride a body of demoralized or beaten troops completely to ruin. That didn't happen in the Civil War- one side broke, retreated, and lived to fight another day.

Just look at Austerlitz- considered Napoleon's best performance. Allied casualties numbered around 27,000 while French casualties didn't even break 9000. That's decisive, and pretty much ended that phase of the Napoleonic wars- the Allied army pretty much ceased to exist. You can't point to a battle in the Civil War like that.

You can point to Civil War battles that changed the tide of the conflict, but none were so lopsided as to be considered decisive

 

[Cletus11]

Civil War battles seldom ended up being "decisive" because of the tactics used. Casualties were high on both sides, so the "winner" was usually just as spent as the loser. For how much Gettysburg is hailed as a decisive Union victory, Union casualties were HIGHER than Confederate, and the AOP was in no shape whatsoever to pursue and destroy a beaten Army of N. Virginia. If the victory were "decisive" it wouldn't have taken another year and a half to finish the war.

On the Confederate side, Chancellorsville is probably their best example of a "decisive" victory, but again, sending the AOP limping back across the Rapahannock could hardly be considered decisive. Casualties were about 18000 Union, 13000 Confederate. A fair difference to be sure, but still not decisive.

One good reason I've read about Civil War battles not being decisive was both sides lack of true Cavalry. Both sides used it primarily as a recon, skirmishing and scouting arm. Compare that to Cavalry in the Napoleonic Wars where it was used as a striking arm that would ride a body of demoralized or beaten troops completely to ruin. That didn't happen in the Civil War- one side broke, retreated, and lived to fight another day.

Just look at Austerlitz- considered Napoleon's best performance. Allied casualties numbered around 27,000 while French casualties didn't even break 9000. That's decisive, and pretty much ended that phase of the Napoleonic wars- the Allied army pretty much ceased to exist. You can't point to a battle in the Civil War like that.

You can point to Civil War battles that changed the tide of the conflict, but none were so lopsided as to be considered decisive

I would agree. I think it came down to the fact the weaponry was so much ahead of the ability for Army leadership to actually know what was going on. You had quality rifles and cannons and yet no air reconnaissance, no telecommunications, and still the ideal of chivalry and walking shoulder to shoulder against an entrenched position.

 

[PSU87]

I would agree. I think it came down to the fact the weaponry was so much ahead of the ability for Army leadership to actually know what was going on. You had quality rifles and cannons and yet no air reconnaissance, no telecommunications, and still the ideal of chivalry and walking shoulder to shoulder against an entrenched position.

I read an interesting article on the "weaponry" theory not too long ago. Its a popular theory- rifled muskets and rifled cannon made the killing ranges longer, and tactics didn't evolve to suit the longer effective ranges. The article went to great lengths to debunk the theory, using several European conflicts that used the same weaponry that resulted in much lower casualty rates. The article stated that the reason that Civil War casualties were so high was that both sides had so very few officers with real combat experience that they just did not handle their troops well in the field.

 

[bmusser24]

Local historian/author Jeffry Wert has written several books about the civil war and specifically Gettysburg.