My brother and I have a personal interest in the Philippines, following are sampling of some views from various historians refered to in a senior paper....the complete paper is found in the link below
The Bastards of Bataan:
General Douglas MacArthur’s Role in the
Fall of the Philippines during World War II
Link:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&sou...WMAh6BAgFEAE&usg=AOvVaw1LqcpzKKmRMecA7eCdWuB0
...Here, on Bataan, Kennedy argues, MacArthur made another mistake by doing nothing to help rally his men. In fact he saw them only once during the months they were on Bataan and he was on the small island fortress Corregidor. Feeling very much abandoned and desolate the soldiers on Bataan soon nicknamed MacArthur, “Dugout Doug”, and started referring to themselves as the “Battling Bastards of Bataan.”...
Stanley Falk addresses the effectiveness of War Plan Orange-3 in “The Army inthe Southwest Pacific.” Since the acquisition of the Philippines the United States government had struggled with how best to defend them.
Here then began War Plan Orange-3 which was the final plan for the Philippines defense.
In this plan the major portion of the Islands would be lost to the Japanese, but the American and Filipino forces would hold Manila Bay until the Navy could acquire the needed men and supplies to
retake the Philippines.
Falk, however, is very critical of this plan, pointing out that as
early as 1941 many believed this plan to be impossible, due to the unexpected strength of the Japanese Army. Thus, because of previous arrangements made by Roosevelt and Churchill of focusing their efforts on Europe first, the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese would have to wait until Nazi Germany was defeated. Perhaps worse than War Plan Orange-3, Falk believes that MacArthur’s plan for the defense of the Philippines was unrealistic and overly optimistic. He even went as far as to argue
“…that the emphasis on the operations in the Southwest Pacific, in large part due to the ‘forceful presence’ of MacArthur, was a waste of resources.” Falk argues that MacArthur’s continual push for the defense of the Philippines was misguided and unwarranted. He believed that the Philippines were of no strategic significance to the United States, and that instigating War Plan Orange-3, although flawed, at the beginning of the war would have saved many lives. He argues that the Japanese would have surrendered the Philippines when they lost the war, and that building up of logistical
supplies on Bataan would have kept many of the men alive until help arrived.
Falk sees the defense of the Philippines as MacArthur’s “project” and not as any lasting significance in retrospect to the rest of the war, but as an unnecessary loss of life. Perhaps the most quoted and widely acknowledged MacArthur historian, Louis Morton, is often the most critical of the General. In such writings as The Decision to Withdraw to Bataan, The Battling Bastards of Bataan, Egotist in Uniform and The Fall of the Philippines, Morton divulges the controversy surrounding MacArthur. He even goes
as far as to say that “…with everything involving MacArthur we are faced with
contradiction
.”
One of these contradictions centered on War Plan Orange-3. Morton
points out that War Plan Orange-3 was a joint Army and Navy plan, and much like Morton is very critical of MacArthur’s sudden enactment of War Plan Orange-3. Morton asserts that MacArthur waited too long to withdraw to Bataan and as a result did not leave himself sufficient time to gather the necessary supplies.
Like Anderson and Beck, Morton sees this as MacArthur’s biggest failure; arguing that there were more than enough signs to clue MacArthur into the fact that his men were unprepared and no match for the Japanese. However, Morton is also very critical of MacArthur when he does decide to retreat to Bataan after loosing drastically to the Japanese, he argues that without
acquiring the much needed food, water, medical and other military supplies the soldiers were being led to their doom.It then became the effects of disease and starvation which forced the men to surrender.
David Kennedy in Freedom from Fear argues that MacArthur had enough time
and resources to mount a counterattack on the Japanese at Formosa following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Kennedy calls MacArthur’s failure to do so incredible and unforgivable.45 The result was the elimination of the United States Air Force in the Far East and the sacrifice of the men, both American and Filipino on the Philippines. This Air Force was MacArthur’s “…claim to be able to defend the Philippines indefinitely.” With this much needed source destroyed MacArthur was forced to withdraw to Bataan.
Here, on Bataan, Kennedy argues, MacArthur made another mistake by doing nothing to help rally his men. In fact he saw them only once during the months they were on Bataan and he was on the small island fortress Corregidor. Feeling very much abandoned and desolate the soldiers on Bataan soon nicknamed MacArthur, “Dugout Doug”, and started referring to themselves as the “Battling Bastards of Bataan.”
This is significant because it shows the state of the soldiers at the time of the attacks by the Japanese. They were no match for the Japanese and unprepared to hold out against them on Bataan.
The fall of the Philippines will forever be remembered as “…the worse defeat yet
suffered by the United States, a source of national humiliation.”
Thousands of soldiers lost their lives at the hands of the Japanese as well as to the fatal affects of diseases. Their sacrifice goes beyond anything that can be comprehended and understood by those who didn’t experience it. It is their sacrifice and experiences which were the real consequences of the fall.
“We’re the battling Bastards of Bataan
No mama, no papa, and no Uncle Sam,
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
No rifles, no planes or artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!
“We are MacArthur’s bastards
A fighting in Bataan
With neither father nor mother
Nor their old Uncle Sam.”
