Should just kick it. Once you start down that path, you're always chasing points and usually end up l needing another score.
What analytics. Give some detailsNot true….analytics say to go for it exactly when Franklin did and the coaches who follow analytics would have gone for it too (ask the Eagles).
That if you are playing to win and you’re down 14 and score a TD, you go for two after the first TD….making the win ride on an extra point….if you miss the two point conversion, you have the next opportunity to go for two. We discussed this at great lengths in a prior game thread.What analytics. Give some details
What analytics. Give some details
Analytics say to go for it. But analytics don’t factor in game flow. Both teams were going up and down the field in that game. So in my view, it was way too early to go for 2 in that particular game.
I agree if the rate is over 50% but I don't think it is.Agreed. Still an entire quarter to play at the time. If we score late to bring it to within 1, it’s a no brainer to go for two if the analytics say the conversion rate is better than 50/50.
I think the idea was to try to get in position to win in regulation. I didn't like it, but overall I thought he coached better in a big game than he usually does.Just seemed like more panic game day decisions by him. I can't think of a single reason to go for 2 at that time.
Don’t worry, we’ll be reading about this decision for years on here even though it had no impact on the outcome of the game.I think the idea was to try to get in position to win in regulation. I didn't like it, but overall I thought he coached better in a big game than he usually does.
The success rate of the two point conversion has been declining, making all analytic charts irrelevant because they base it on it being a 50-50 play, which it’s not. Not to mention momentum and the emotional deflating aspect when you fail on an attempt.I agree if the rate is over 50% but I don't think it is.
That's not how logic works.I don’t know if he understands it or not.
I’m saying that you can’t use analytics as justification for going for 2 in that scenario while brushing aside analytics at other points in the game. If you are using analytics, then you should apply it in all situations.
Analytics isn’t really about outsmarting anybody. The odds and rationale isn’t some super secret intellectual property. It is all about playing the odds and doing what gives you the best chances of winning.
NittanyChris say: "STATISTICS ARE HARD!"The success rate of the two point conversion has been declining, making all analytic charts irrelevant because they base it on it being a 50-50 play, which it’s not. Not to mention momentum and the emotional deflating aspect when you fail on an attempt.
“According to recent data, the success rate for a 2-point conversion in college football in 2024 is around 32.4%.”
“In the 2024 NFL season, teams have been converting two-point conversions at a record low rate of 31.3%.”
Patently false. And there was absolutely nothing wrong with "going for the deep ball" ... the problem was with the particular play call, and the throw itself. 2nd and 1? Yeah, call a play to take a shot. You have 2 more plays to make 1 yard if you throw an incompletion. What you can't do, under any circumstances there, is throw an interceptable ball.For sure. And, he just doesn't utilize it correctly. It seems forced and chasing most of the time, like going for the deep ball at the end of the game. JFs 'feel' for the game and understanding momentum is horrid.
What is this elusive "analytics" concept is that is becoming an excuse for when coaches make decisions that defy common sense? Is it a book? Is it a computer program?Not true….analytics say to go for it exactly when Franklin did and the coaches who follow analytics would have gone for it too (ask the Eagles).
Penn State's 2 point conversion rate for the season is 0% (0-2). It was a boneheaded decision.I agree if the rate is over 50% but I don't think it is.
Or throw it to 44 who was crossing right in front of Drew wide open about 20 yards down field.Patently false. And there was absolutely nothing wrong with "going for the deep ball" ... the problem was with the particular play call, and the throw itself. 2nd and 1? Yeah, call a play to take a shot. You have 2 more plays to make 1 yard if you throw an incompletion. What you can't do, under any circumstances there, is throw an interceptable ball.
What is this elusive "analytics" concept is that is becoming an excuse for when coaches make decisions that defy common sense?
On top of this, it’s easier to stop them from their side of the field during regulation than it is to stop them on our side of the field in OT.Here is the simplest breakdown of it I can give you.
It's about the time left and number of possessions you can reasonably expect to have. Down 14, if you want to end the game in regulation, you have to score at least 15 points if you can stop them from score again.
Once we scored, we go for the 2 as soon as possible because the result tells you how many possessions you still need. Miss it? You can still attempt another and tie it. Get it, you can score and kick for a 1 pt lead. Miss both, you need a FG.
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I'm not advocate for this approach. This is just a short form version of the why behind it.
Reminds me of the scene in the movie "Doc Hollywood" when hotshot Ben Stone wanted to airlift a kid to a major hospital and crack his chest because he believed he was a cardiac crisis. Old Doc Hogue shows up and hands the parents a can of Coke -- it was just indigestion brought on when the kid got into his dad's chewing tobacco (again).What is this elusive "analytics" concept is that is becoming an excuse for when coaches make decisions that defy common sense? Is it a book? Is it a computer program?
If it is a computer program, does it take into consideration PSU's success rate at 2 point conversions, Oregon's success in defending the 2 point conversion or the momentum in the game? Is it analyzing the situation from a pure mathmatical standpoint without any consideration of the actual players, teams or the flow / momentum of the game?
If "analytics" is a pure mathmatical calculation based upon score and overall success rate of all college football teams, then "analytics" needs further developement before I take the "analytics" as a valid excuse for obviously poor coaching decisions. I would guess that 90% of the viewers were saying WTF is Penn State doing when they went for 2 when they could have pulled within 7 with an extra point. It made absolutely no sense whatsoever when the decision was made.
The best coaches have a feel for the game and make decisions based upon their own instincts, not based upon some computer geek's mathmatical calculations. James Franklin has a lot of strengths that make him a good coach but, IMO, his greatest weakness is that he does not have great instincts when he is making these types of game time decisions.
What is this elusive "analytics" concept is that is becoming an excuse for when coaches make decisions that defy common sense? Is it a book? Is it a computer program?
If it is a computer program, does it take into consideration PSU's success rate at 2 point conversions, Oregon's success in defending the 2 point conversion or the momentum in the game? Is it analyzing the situation from a pure mathmatical standpoint without any consideration of the actual players, teams or the flow / momentum of the game?
If "analytics" is a pure mathmatical calculation based upon score and overall success rate of all college football teams, then "analytics" needs further developement before I take the "analytics" as a valid excuse for obviously poor coaching decisions. I would guess that 90% of the viewers were saying WTF is Penn State doing when they went for 2 when they could have pulled within 7 with an extra point. It made absolutely no sense whatsoever when the decision was made.
The best coaches have a feel for the game and make decisions based upon their own instincts, not based upon some computer geek's mathmatical calculations. James Franklin has a lot of strengths that make him a good coach but, IMO, his greatest weakness is that he does not have great instincts when he is making these types of game time decisions.
When you are down 14 in the fourth quarter and score a TD, if you kick the PAT you need 2 more stops and 2 more scores to win unless you go for 2 at the end and get it. Don’t see why you would do that if you were unwilling to go for 2 after the first score.I didn’t have a problem with the 2 point try there, but thought it was a bad play call. I think the idea was that he knew we couldn’t stop them in overtime and wanted to win it in regulation. Obviously needing 2 TDs, you still have the second one to score 2 to tie if the first fails. Call it panic or whatever you want. I think that decision was based more on game flow than analytics.
If I’m a D Coordinator for the opponent right there, I am thinking Warren is getting the ball. Sell out to stop Warren. If I’m Andy K, I am thinking decoy the Hell out of Warren and look for Dinkens whom they surely would have forgotten. And don’t get too cute, because we tend misalign or screw up assignments on the cutesy plays way too often.
Somebody mentioned above, we all remember the one fake punt that worked. I would be curious to know what our success rate is on trick plays during the Franklin era. And I don’t have a problem running them. They just always look like something just drawn up in dirt in the huddle.
You’re pushing at an open door. I agree with you, and I never said he shouldn’t have gone for 2 in that situation. He should have. That doesn’t excuse his poor decision to not go for two before the half. Sorry you didn’t pick that up. I’ll type slower next time.That's not how logic works.
He made the correct call to go for 2 in that situation. Poor play call, but the call to go for 2 was correct. That he does or doesn't make the correct calls in other situations doesn't mean he should or shouldn't make the correct call here.