We've seen the Diamond back field with Vega at FB. And we still haven't dusted off the Power T yet.
Still don’t understand why JF punted from our own 42 on 4th and less than a yard in the 2nd Quarter.
- Thread starter PSUWrestlingFanSince2011
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We've seen the Diamond back field with Vega at FB. And we still haven't dusted off the Power T yet.
Well, today is Monday and people seem to know exactly what calls should have been made 2 days ago.
Analytics may say go for it on 4th and less than two yards but what analytics doesn't tell you or take into account are the 300 lb All-American defensive tackles you're facing or the quality of the opponent's defensive line. Fourth and two against Indiana is not the same as fourth-and-two against Alabama. Analytics doesn't break that down.
Personally, I think one should never go for it on 4th down on your own side of the 50. Why risk giving your opponent momentum and a short field, especially if you have a good defense?
Learn from JoePa's mistake:
johnbaranowski.wordpress.com
Personally, I think one should never go for it on 4th down on your own side of the 50. Why risk giving your opponent momentum and a short field, especially if you have a good defense?
Learn from JoePa's mistake:
It is not the critic who counts
Imagine this scenario: A young college football head coach had a 5-5 record in his first season as head coach and his team did not make a bowl game. It took until his second year for that coach to …
johnbaranowski.wordpress.com
So, I'm on the conservative side but it depends on a lot of things...
What's the score? Who are you playing? How effective is your offense? How's your defense playing?
Part of the problem with just looking at analytics (see Gruden) is that it isn't truly considering everything.
It's like coaches that blindly go for 2 after scoring when they were down by 14--sometimes it's smart--other times pure stupidity
Especially facing an underdog in the 2nd qtr of a tied game. If they make the stop they will come off the field all pumped up and confident as hell.Analytics may say go for it on 4th and less than two yards but what analytics doesn't tell you or take into account are the 300 lb All-American defensive tackles you're facing or the quality of the opponent's defensive line. Fourth and two against Indiana is not the same as fourth-and-two against Alabama. Analytics doesn't break that down.
Personally, I think one should never go for it on 4th down on your own side of the 50. Why risk giving your opponent momentum and a short field, especially if you have a good defense?
Learn from JoePa's mistake:
It is not the critic who counts
Imagine this scenario: A young college football head coach had a 5-5 record in his first season as head coach and his team did not make a bowl game. It took until his second year for that coach to …
No matter the analytics, football is a very emotional game. Especially college.
It was a home game with ‘White Out energy’. We turn it over there and they take the lead…..the crowd goes dead and we lose a huge advantage.
Analytics may say go for it on 4th and less than two yards but what analytics doesn't tell you or take into account are the 300 lb All-American defensive tackles you're facing or the quality of the opponent's defensive line. Fourth and two against Indiana is not the same as fourth-and-two against Alabama. Analytics doesn't break that down.
Personally, I think one should never go for it on 4th down on your own side of the 50. Why risk giving your opponent momentum and a short field, especially if you have a good defense?
Learn from JoePa's mistake:
It is not the critic who counts
Imagine this scenario: A young college football head coach had a 5-5 record in his first season as head coach and his team did not make a bowl game. It took until his second year for that coach to …
This topic is a favorite of mine, but I'll try to keep it short ... "analytics" are used, and have been used, since the beginning of the game. All sorts of different things are "analytics." It's just that today's analytics are better than the ones they used to use.
For example, you think the 50 yard line is some magic barrier where you make one decision on one side of it, and perhaps another decision on the other side. Why? So if you're on your own 45, you'd never go for it on 4th. But if you're on their 45, you might? What if (I'm just throwing out made up numbers here) the other squad is 30% likely to score if you go for it and fail from your own 45, but 25% likely to score from their 45? And what if you're 75% likely to convert, and then, overall, 20% likely to score thereafter? We have that kind of analysis now (and much, much more). Or we can just stay in the ancient analytics world of "mid field be magic ... no go if no crossed").
And, actually, analytics can, or may in the future, "take into account ... the 300 lb All-American defensive tackles," indirectly or directly. Analytics may have looked at quality of opponent ... either overall, or in specific categories (run defense, etc.) ... and determined what the percentages are in that situation ... and maybe that percentage doesn't change enough to warrant a different decision.
But all these "traditional" decisions that have been made for years are evidence, themselves, of "analytics." You don't do X because you think the expected value of success in that circumstance is outweighed by the expected value of failure. But, modern day analytics actually looks at each time it happens or doesn't, and can give you the reality of expected outcome, rather than your guesstimate, which you've relied on for years.
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In a 7-7 game, you don’t go for it at the 40 against Illinois.
In a 14-3 game, maybe.
And let’s not forget… JF, like all of us, had a little PTSD from the 9 OT loss to an inferior Illinois team.
It was the right call at that point in the game.
In a 14-3 game, maybe.
And let’s not forget… JF, like all of us, had a little PTSD from the 9 OT loss to an inferior Illinois team.
It was the right call at that point in the game.
And the 4th and 3 decision to go for it wasn’t bad either.
Risk reward appraisal…
Reward of 3 points at the foot of a shaky kicker. Not much reward and some risk
Reward of a sustained drive leading to a control-taking touchdown versus the risk of giving Illinois the ball in bad field position when your defense is dominating. Bigger reward and some risk.
Coach K just got beat on the play call by Illinois DC. It happens.
Risk reward appraisal…
Reward of 3 points at the foot of a shaky kicker. Not much reward and some risk
Reward of a sustained drive leading to a control-taking touchdown versus the risk of giving Illinois the ball in bad field position when your defense is dominating. Bigger reward and some risk.
Coach K just got beat on the play call by Illinois DC. It happens.
It was the right call. There’s a chance Illinois gets the turnover on downs, then they have the momentum and potentially go up another score to put us behind at a time in the game we weren’t scoring much. Then, if we were behind typically Bielema would start pounding the rock and eating time and we would be throwing it more than we’d like getting away from our strength in that game.
It was a very throwback JoePa call for field position and that won him a heck of a lot of games. It was refreshing to see from my vantage point.
Well, we won so you are correct. There is no way to tell what would have happened had we taken a different path. If Singleton's fumble was not overturned you may have a different result. If the running play on 3rd and 3 was a passing play and got picked off it would be a different result. We only know what happened. In hindsight, what happened was good. We beat the #19 ranked team soundly. We move onto UCLA still undefeated. That is all that matters.
Can you imagine the meltdown here if he went for the 2nd qtr 4th down…..didn’t make it…..Illinois uses the momentum to drive for a TD?
The wailing and gnashing of teeth would be epic!
yeah. second-guessing the coach on most individual plays is just something for fans to talk about. And to be fair, I complain as much as anyone. If we'd gone for it and failed, you'd hear a ton of screaming. We also don't know what is happening on the sideline: players banged up, winded, not performing, and suffering a confidence problem....and all of this has to be processed in 35 seconds (and less).
and you get into these 49/51 calls where there isn't a clear choice. Had he gone for it, I wouldn't have blamed him or complained. To me this is almost a 50/50 decision.
Finally Franklin makes a good decision where he usually would make a bonehead one. You punt the ball !!! If the defense stops the fourth down it gives them momentum and they go down and score, it could have been a complete game changing decision. If I remember correctly Blackledge wanted him to go for it which shocked me.
I watched Paterno enough to know he would have punted the ball also.
Now your kicker who missed a mid range FG knows you don’t even trust him to hit a short one. Later you then ask him to hit another from mid range. Talk about in your own kickers head!
I didn’t have a problem with either call with how the flow of the game was going. 4th and one at your own 42 in a tie ballgame is too risky, no matter how well your OL is playing. I agree with the 4th and 3 call to go for it because Sander missed a 40 yard kick earlier in the game and his confidence was shaken. I wouldn’t even have confidence for him to make the 30 yard kick at that moment.
I would have rather he go for it as well, but every coach has a reason for the decisions they make at certain times….problem is, if they don’t work, the Monday morning coaches are always right. I usually wait until the game is over to see how upset I am…if they win, then it was the right call.
Matt Rhule's name would be mentioned multiple times.
I believe Rhule is something like 2-20 against top 20 teams which Franklin just defeated a top 20 team without a reliable field goal kicker. In many cases, it's more the Jimmys and the Joes than the Xs and the Os.
